Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C, Ian McFetridge and Herbert B. Enderton

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58 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
∈ says the whole set is in the other; ⊆ says the members of the subset are in the other [Enderton]
A 'linear or total ordering' must be transitive and satisfy trichotomy [Enderton]
The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}} [Enderton]
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ [Enderton]
The empty set may look pointless, but many sets can be constructed from it [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
The singleton is defined using the pairing axiom (as {x,x}) [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Fraenkel added Replacement, to give a theory of ordinal numbers [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
We can only define functions if Choice tells us which items are involved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]