Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C, Francesco Orsi and Lars Svendsen

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
9307 Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
9297 You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
13913 The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
13914 Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13915 Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
13916 Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13850 In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13849 Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13851 Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
13852 Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
9308 If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
9309 Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
9304 Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9310 The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen]
9302 We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen]
9301 Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen]
9298 We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
9311 We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
9303 The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen]