Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Engelbretsen,G/Sayward,C, D.J. O'Connor and Alan McMichael

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael]
Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael]