42 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle] |
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |