36 ideas
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
13913 | The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13914 | Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13915 | Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13916 | Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13850 | In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13849 | Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13851 | Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
13852 | Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward] |
5953 | For the Cyrenaics experience was not enough to give certainty about reality [Aristippus young, by Plutarch] |
3023 | Even the foolish may have some virtues [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
3026 | Actions are influenced by circumstances, so Cyrenaics say felons should be reformed, not hated [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
3024 | Cyrenaics teach that honour, justice and shame are all based on custom and fashion [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
3025 | For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
3019 | No one pleasure is different from or more pleasant than another [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
3021 | The Cyrenaics asserted that corporeal pleasures were superior to mental ones [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
3027 | Cyrenaics say wise men are self-sufficient, needing no friends [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius] |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |