262 ideas
9218 | Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider] |
14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
13689 | 'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider] |
13705 | Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider] |
13710 | In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider] |
13706 | Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider] |
13711 | System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider] |
13708 | S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider] |
13712 | Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider] |
13714 | We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider] |
13720 | Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider] |
13718 | The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider] |
13723 | System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
13715 | You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
13680 | Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider] |
13679 | Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider] |
13678 | The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider] |
13682 | Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
13722 | A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
13696 | When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider] |
13700 | A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
13703 | λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider] |
13687 | No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider] |
13688 | Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider] |
13691 | Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider] |
13690 | Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
13685 | Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider] |
13686 | We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider] |
13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
13684 | The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider] |
13704 | It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider] |
13724 | In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider] |
13698 | In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider] |
13699 | Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider] |
13701 | A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider] |
458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
13692 | A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider] |
13693 | A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider] |
13695 | Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider] |
13694 | We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
13683 | A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
13702 | The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider] |
14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
13721 | 'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider] |
13707 | Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider] |
13709 | Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider] |
13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
13719 | Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |
5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |