67 ideas
11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |
552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |