Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Empedocles, Philippa Foot and Simone Weil

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226 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil]
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot]
Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil]
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil]
We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil]
The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
When we admire a work, we see ourselves as its creator [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Those who say immorality is not an aesthetic criterion must show that all criteria are aesthetic [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil]
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil]
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil]
We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil]
We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil]
Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
People in power always try to increase their power [Weil]
In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil]
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil]
After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil]
We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil]
It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
Once money is the main aim, society needs everyone to think wealth is possible [Weil]
The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil]
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil]
People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil]
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil]
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil]
The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil]
Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil]
Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil]
Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Dividing history books into separate chapters is disastrous [Weil]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot]
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil]
The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The cruelty of the Old Testament put me off Christianity [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
I attach little importance to immortality, which is an undecidable fact, and irrelevant to us [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]