Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Empedocles, Paul Benacerraf and J.L. Mackie

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65 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf]
Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C]
A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf]
To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf]
Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf]
The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend]
No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe]
If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf]
The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf]
The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf]
Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf]
Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf]
How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf]
Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [Mackie, by PG]
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [Mackie, by PG]