Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Empedocles, Michel Foucault and David Wiggins

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136 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Early Greeks cared about city and companions; later Greeks concentrated on the self [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Foucault originally felt that liberating reason had become an instrument of domination [Foucault, by Gutting]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting]
Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins]
Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins]
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
The author function of any text is a plurality of selves [Foucault, by Gutting]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Why couldn't a person's life become a work of art? [Foucault]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Nature is not the basis of rights, but the willingness to risk death in asserting them [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Every society has a politics of truth, concerning its values, functions, prestige and mechanisms [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Marxists denounced power as class domination, but never analysed its mechanics [Foucault]
Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault]
Foucault can't accept that power is sometimes decent and benign [Foucault, by Scruton]
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Power is used to create identities and ways of life for other people [Foucault, by Shorten]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]