Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Empedocles, M Fitting/R Mendelsohn and Michael Walzer

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94 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / a. Symbols of ML
Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / c. Derivation rules of ML
Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
□P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / e. System K4
The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
□ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer]
Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer]
The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer]
With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer]
States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer]
Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer]
Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer]
The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer]
Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer]
Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer]
We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer]
Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer]
Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer]
Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer]
What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer]
If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood]
Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles]
The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles]
Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles]
If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles]
God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles]