352 ideas
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
19807 | Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
7235 | Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau] |
19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
20759 | Feelings are prior to intelligence; we should be content to live with our simplest feelings [Rousseau] |
19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
19791 | Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau] |
19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
20501 | Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J] |
7237 | The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau] |
19792 | To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau] |
19812 | Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau] |
19822 | If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau] |
19823 | If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau] |
19814 | A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau] |
19815 | Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau] |
7234 | No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau] |
19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
7232 | Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau] |
19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
19816 | A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau] |
7247 | The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau] |
19838 | The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau] |
19848 | The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau] |
19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
20567 | Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala] |
19801 | Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau] |
19805 | Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau] |
19818 | Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau] |
19790 | Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau] |
7233 | The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau] |
19842 | The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau] |
7239 | The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau] |
19793 | We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau] |
7240 | To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau] |
19795 | The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau] |
19797 | Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau] |
19796 | Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau] |
7244 | The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau] |
19802 | The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau] |
19803 | If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau] |
19804 | If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau] |
19808 | The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau] |
7246 | The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau] |
7250 | Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau] |
19844 | Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau] |
19846 | The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau] |
19854 | We all owe labour in return for our keep, and every idle citizen is a thief [Rousseau] |
19817 | Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau] |
19840 | A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau] |
19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
19839 | The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau] |
19798 | Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau] |
19831 | The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau] |
19833 | Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau] |
19834 | Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau] |
19829 | Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau] |
7249 | Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau] |
19830 | Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau] |
19827 | Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau] |
19820 | The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau] |
19821 | I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau] |
19824 | Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau] |
19826 | Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau] |
19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
19837 | If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau] |
19843 | The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau] |
19825 | If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau] |
19832 | Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau] |
19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
7243 | Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau] |
19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
7251 | The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau] |
7238 | Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau] |
19828 | Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau] |
19835 | When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau] |
19745 | The nature of people is decided by the government and politics of their society [Rousseau] |
19849 | In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau] |
19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
19841 | Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau] |
19847 | We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau] |
19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
7242 | Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau] |
19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
19800 | The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau] |
19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
7248 | No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau] |
19794 | If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau] |
7241 | In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau] |
19806 | We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau] |
19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
19799 | Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau] |
19819 | The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau] |
19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
7245 | Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau] |
19809 | We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau] |
19810 | A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau] |
19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
19811 | Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau] |
7236 | War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau] |
23607 | Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau] |
19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
19850 | By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau] |
19852 | Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau] |
19853 | All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau] |
19851 | Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau] |
19836 | The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau] |
19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |
461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |
7252 | A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau] |