Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, W.H. Newton-Smith and Terry Pinkard

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
22002 Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard]
22021 Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard]
22010 The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
22036 In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3859 We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith]
3853 For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith]
3870 The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
3855 Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
3854 Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
3869 More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith]
3861 Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
3867 De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
3872 We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
22048 Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
3857 Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
3858 A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
3862 All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith]
3863 The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith]
3864 Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
3865 Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
3866 If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]