Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, W Kneale / M Kneale and Mark Rowlands

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
6161 Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
10051 The axiom of infinity is not a truth of logic, and its adoption is an abandonment of logicism [Kneale,W and M]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
6163 If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
6155 Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
6157 Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
6159 Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
6152 Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
6173 Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
6174 If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
6158 Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6168 The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
6167 Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6177 Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
6156 The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6170 Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
6178 It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]