Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Tom Milsted and Robert van Gulick

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]