Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Stephen Boulter and James Woodward

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22138 Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
22134 Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
22150 Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22139 Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22136 Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
14367 An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
22135 Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
22152 Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22156 The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]