37 ideas
| 23708 | Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG] |
| 23709 | Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23707 | Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23711 | A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23712 | Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23698 | Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23699 | 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23700 | A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23701 | A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23702 | A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23703 | Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23704 | We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 20289 | Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer] |
| 20286 | Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer] |
| 20282 | The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer] |
| 20278 | 'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer] |
| 20281 | Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer] |
| 20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
| 20290 | Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer] |
| 20288 | You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer] |
| 21997 | In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer] |
| 20287 | If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer] |
| 21993 | Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer] |
| 20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
| 20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
| 20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
| 20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
| 20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |
| 23706 | Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |