Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Neil E. Williams and Christine M. Korsgaard

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


40 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE]
Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE]
A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE]
Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE]
We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE]
Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE]
Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE]
Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE]
Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
To make sense of personal identity, focus on agency rather than experience [Korsgaard]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Theory of action focuses on explanation and prediction; practical action on justification and choice [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Maybe final value rests on the extrinsic property of being valued by a rational agent [Korsgaard, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE]
Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE]