70 ideas
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
20594 | Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
21120 | The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten] |
22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |