14 ideas
| 1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
| 15312 | We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 15311 | Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley] |