17 ideas
8964 | Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
8961 | Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
3144 | Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler] |
21315 | A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler] |
8963 | Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
21313 | If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler] |
21314 | Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler] |
21318 | If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
8066 | Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler] |