Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Jan Westerhoff and E Sosa / M Tooley

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley]
If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]