Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, J.J.C. Smart and Rayo,A/Uzquiasno,G

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The two best understood conceptions of set are the Iterative and the Limitation of Size [Rayo/Uzquiano]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
Some set theories give up Separation in exchange for a universal set [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
We could have unrestricted quantification without having an all-inclusive domain [Rayo/Uzquiano]
Absolute generality is impossible, if there are indefinitely extensible concepts like sets and ordinals [Rayo/Uzquiano]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Perhaps second-order quantifications cover concepts of objects, rather than plain objects [Rayo/Uzquiano]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The domain of an assertion is restricted by context, either semantically or pragmatically [Rayo/Uzquiano]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart]