12 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17750 | The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic was in 1928 [Hilbert/Ackermann, by Walicki] |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |