16 ideas
19712 | Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19703 | Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19705 | 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid] |
19706 | Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid] |
19707 | Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid] |
19709 | Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid] |
19704 | Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid] |
19710 | With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid] |
19711 | Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid] |
7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |