40 ideas
22140 | The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice] |
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
10990 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read] |
14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
22330 | Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
18045 | Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor] |
18044 | Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor] |
10991 | Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read] |
18046 | Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |