Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Gregory L. Murphy and T.H. Green

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy]
Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy]
The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy]
The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy]
Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy]
Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy]
Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy]
Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy]
Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy]
The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy]
The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy]
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy]
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy]
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
States only have full authority if they heed the claims of human fellowship [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH]
Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
People are improved by egalitarian institutions and habits [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Equality also implies liberty, because equality must be of opportunity as well as possessions [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
All talk of the progress of a nation must reduce to the progress of its individual members [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
The highest political efforts express our deeper social spirit [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Communism is wrong because it restricts the freedom of individuals to contribute to the community [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Original common ownership is securing private property, not denying it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National spirit only exists in the individuals who embody it [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
The ground of property ownership is not force but the power to use it for social ends [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
Property is needed by all citizens, to empower them to achieve social goods [Green,TH]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH]