43 ideas
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
| 12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
| 12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
| 12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
| 18004 | We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
| 6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
| 13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
| 12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |