27 ideas
3859 | We do not wish merely to predict, we also want to explain [Newton-Smith] |
3870 | The real problem of science is how to choose between possible explanations [Newton-Smith] |
3853 | For science to be rational, we must explain scientific change rationally [Newton-Smith] |
3854 | Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith] |
3855 | Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith] |
3861 | Theories generate infinite truths and falsehoods, so they cannot be used to assess probability [Newton-Smith] |
3869 | More truthful theories have greater predictive power [Newton-Smith] |
8083 | Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin] |
7727 | Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner] |
8686 | Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend] |
22277 | Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter] |
3867 | De re necessity arises from the way the world is [Newton-Smith] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
3872 | We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
3857 | Defeat relativism by emphasising truth and reference, not meaning [Newton-Smith] |
3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
3862 | All theories contain anomalies, and so are falsified! [Newton-Smith] |
3863 | The anomaly of Uranus didn't destroy Newton's mechanics - it led to Neptune's discovery [Newton-Smith] |
3864 | Anomalies are judged against rival theories, and support for the current theory [Newton-Smith] |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |