42 ideas
23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |