40 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |