11 ideas
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman] |
19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
5470 | The idea of laws of nature arose in the Middle Ages [Hall,AR, by Ellis] |