Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Derek Parfit and Thomas Bayes

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20 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first [Bayes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]