Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, David-Hillel Ruben and Michael D. Resnik

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
17082 Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
6299 Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
6304 Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
6300 Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik]
6303 Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
6302 Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik]
6295 There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik]
6296 Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik]
6301 Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
17087 The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17081 Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
17092 An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17090 Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17094 The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
17088 Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
17089 Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]