Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Daniel Statman and David-Hillel Ruben

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]