Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Daniel Statman and Charles Chihara

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38 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]