26 ideas
22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver] |
4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver] |
4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations [Mellor/Oliver] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |