Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Crawford L. Elder and Erik J. Olsson

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17 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
13795 Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
13798 Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13797 The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13794 Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
13796 Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
21515 Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
21514 Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]