32 ideas
| 14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
| 13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
| 14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
| 13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
| 13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
| 13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
| 13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
| 13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
| 13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
| 13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
| 13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |
| 20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
| 20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
| 20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
| 20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
| 20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
| 20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
| 20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
| 20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
| 20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
| 20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
| 20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
| 20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
| 20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |