59 ideas
18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
10580 | Mathematics is both necessary and a priori because it really consists of logical truths [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
10579 | Putting numbers in quantifiable position (rather than many quantifiers) makes expression easier [Yablo] |
10577 | Concrete objects have few essential properties, but properties of abstractions are mostly essential [Yablo] |
10578 | We are thought to know concreta a posteriori, and many abstracta a priori [Yablo] |
19489 | For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo] |
19490 | Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo] |
19491 | 'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
14381 | A statue is essentially the statue, but its lump is not essentially a statue, so statue isn't lump [Yablo, by Rocca] |
18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
19493 | Governing possible worlds theory is the fiction that if something is possible, it happens in a world [Yablo] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
10805 | A sentence should be recarved to reveal its content or implication relations [Yablo] |
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |