14 ideas
| 14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
| 14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
| 11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
| 14528 | Maybe modal thought is unavoidable, as a priori recognition of necessary truth-preservation in reasoning [Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
| 14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
| 22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |