Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Bernard Linsky and H.L.A. Hart

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32 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
18776 Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
18774 Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19542 It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19543 To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
19541 Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19540 Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19539 If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23529 Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
23530 The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
23522 In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
23528 The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
21004 Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
23523 The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
23524 Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
23521 Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
23525 Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
23526 Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
20932 Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
20931 Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
23527 Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]