27 ideas
| 12772 | Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen] |
| 12771 | Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen] |
| 12773 | Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen] |
| 12770 | We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen] |
| 14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
| 19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
| 14629 | If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn] |
| 14529 | If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
| 14917 | To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen] |
| 6784 | Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 12769 | Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen] |
| 13066 | An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon] |
| 12768 | We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
| 11911 | Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn] |
| 2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
| 2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
| 23223 | The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn] |