63 ideas
| 3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
| 3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
| 3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
| 8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 11223 | Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta] |
| 11215 | Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta] |
| 11225 | A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta] |
| 11227 | The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta] |
| 11224 | Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta] |
| 11226 | Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta] |
| 11221 | A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta] |
| 11217 | Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta] |
| 11216 | If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta] |
| 11218 | Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta] |
| 11220 | Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta] |
| 14965 | Truth rests on Elimination ('A' is true → A) and Introduction (A → 'A' is true) [Gupta] |
| 14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
| 11222 | The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta] |
| 4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
| 14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
| 14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
| 3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
| 8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
| 19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
| 8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
| 3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
| 3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
| 19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
| 4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
| 8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
| 3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
| 3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
| 3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
| 4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
| 21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
| 21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
| 21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
| 21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
| 21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
| 21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
| 21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| 4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
| 3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
| 4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
| 8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
| 4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
| 3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
| 3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
| 8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
| 3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
| 19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
| 3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |