Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J, Mark Sainsbury and Peter Koellner

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29 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]