31 ideas
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |