Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J, C.B. Martin and Henri Bergson

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
8226 A well-posed problem is a problem solved [Bergson, by Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
15477 Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
15471 Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
21846 Bergson was a rallying point, because he emphasised becomings and multiplicities [Bergson, by Deleuze]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
15484 A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
15478 Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15483 Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15480 Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
15489 A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
15487 If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
15479 Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
15488 Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
15469 Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15467 Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
15466 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15476 Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
15465 Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
15481 I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15474 Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15486 Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
15475 The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
15472 It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
21854 Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
15492 Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
15495 Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15493 Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
22100 Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
15485 Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
15491 Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15468 Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
15470 Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
15482 We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]