38 ideas
18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
4020 | The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C] |
4002 | My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C] |
4006 | I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C] |
4003 | Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C] |
4021 | Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C] |
4005 | To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C] |
4004 | Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C] |
4010 | In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C] |
22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
4009 | Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C] |