Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Correia,F/Schnieder,B, Zeno (Citium) and Nathan Salmon

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man's chief strength is not being tricked; nothing is worse than error, frivolity or rashness [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
When shown seven versions of the mowing argument, he paid twice the asking price for them [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Philosophy has three parts, studying nature, character, and rational discourse [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson]
S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Zeno achieved the statement of the problems of infinitesimals, infinity and continuity [Russell on Zeno of Citium]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception an open hand, a fist is 'grasping', and holding that fist is knowledge [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
If a grasped perception cannot be shaken by argument, it is 'knowledge' [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A presentation is true if we judge that no false presentation could appear like it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
When a slave said 'It was fated that I should steal', Zeno replied 'Yes, and that you should be beaten' [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
A dog tied to a cart either chooses to follow and is pulled, or it is just pulled [Zeno of Citium, by Hippolytus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Incorporeal substances can't do anything, and can't be acted upon either [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
A sentence always has signification, but a word by itself never does [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N]
Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Zeno said live in agreement with nature, which accords with virtue [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
Since we are essentially rational animals, living according to reason is living according to nature [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The goal is to 'live in agreement', according to one rational consistent principle [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Zeno saw virtue as a splendid state, not just a source of splendid action [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Zeno says there are four main virtues, which are inseparable but distinct [Zeno of Citium, by Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
There is no void in the cosmos, but indefinite void outside it [Zeno of Citium, by Ps-Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Things are more perfect if they have reason; nothing is more perfect than the universe, so it must have reason [Zeno of Citium]
Since the cosmos produces what is alive and rational, it too must be alive and rational [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Rational is better than non-rational; the cosmos is supreme, so it is rational [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
If tuneful flutes grew on olive trees, you would assume the olive had some knowledge of the flute [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
The cosmos and heavens are the substance of god [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]