15 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| 18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
| 22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 20558 | Your representative owes you his judgement, and betrays you if he gives your opinion instead [Burke] |